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Abstract: The recent historical turn within the analytic tradition
has experienced growing enthusiasm concerning the procedure of
rational reconstruction, whose validity or importance, despite its
paradigmatic examples in Frege and Russell, has not always enjoyed
a consensus. Among the analytic philosophers who are the fron-
trunners of such a movement, Robert Brandom is one of a kind: his
work on Hegel as well as on German Idealism has been increasing
interest in, as well as awareness of, Hegel’s contributions to some
current problems in that tradition. Thus, this work aims to show
Brandom’s methodology of rational reconstruction, based on the
distinction between de dicto and de re inferences. Afterwards, I turn
to Kierkegaard in order to make explicit some of his ontological
commitments by applying Brandom’s approach as a valuable tool for
doing history of philosophy.
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Resumo: A recente virada histórica no interior da filosofia analítica
tem contribuído para o crescimento no interesse acerca do procedi-
mento da reconstrução racional, cuja validade ou importância, a des-
peito de ter exemplos paradigmáticos em Frege e Russell, não foi sem-
pre um consenso. Entre os filósofos analíticos pioneiros nesse movi-
mento, Robert Brandom merece especial destaque: seu trabalho sobre
Hegel e o Idealismo Alemão tem despertado a atenção tanto sobre a
exegese do filósofo de Jena, quanto acerca de suas possíveis contribui-
ções para problemas atuais. Assim, este trabalho tem como objetivo
expor o método de Brandom baseado na distinção entre inferências
de dicto e de re. Num segundo momento, faço um exercício de aplica-
ção de tal método a Kierkegaard, explicitando seus comprometimen-
tos ontológicos evidenciando tal abordagem como uma valiosa ferra-
menta para a história da filosofia.
Palavras-chave: Kierkegaard, Brandom, Reconstrução Racional, On-
tologia, Metafilosofia.
*Professor do Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia da Universidade do Vale do Rio dos Sinos (UNISINOS).
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2255-5173. E-mail: gabrielferreira@unisinos.br.
Revista de Filosofia Moderna e Contemporânea, Brasília, v.7, n.2, ago. 2019, p. 221-238
ISSN: 2317-9570
221
GABRIEL FERREIRA DA SILVA
1 - Introduction
Analytic philosophy had a self-
image as a trend or philosophi-
cal perspective that was not only
non-historic, but even opposed to
any interference of a historical ap-
proach to philosophy (see BEA-
NEY, 2016; RECK, 2013). Howe-
ver, such a view has been chal-
lenged in different ways; among
them, I would like to point two
that are especially relevant for
my purposes here. Firstly, as it
is now widely acknowledged, the
quarrel between Dummett and
Sluga on the influences of previ-
ous philosophers –mainly Lotze–
on Frege, as well as Soames’s book
and the debates after it, revea-
led new facets of the then stan-
dard narratives about analytic
philosophers. As Beaney (2016)
points out, even the view about
some of the archetypical figures
of the anti-historical approach,
like Frege himself, but also Rus-
sell and Wittgenstein, have chan-
ged since then. The second aspect
where we can see the “historical
turn” in analytic philosophy is not
related to what we could call a his-
torical sensibility when it comes
to interpretation of now canonical
analytic philosophers like Frege
or Russell—which is a historical
enterprise in itself—but in the
reassessment of possible contri-
butions to current philosophical
problems by philosophers from
the past. Starting with different
modes of engagement with Kan-
tian philosophy by analytic philo-
sophers like Sellars, Strawson and
Rawls, but also with Descartes,
Leibniz, Hume, and even ancient
philosophy, analytic philosophers
have been increasing the place
and importance for dialogue with
the history of philosophy. It is in
this scenario that the “Pittsburgh
School,” led by Robert Brandom
and John McDowell, moves into
what Paul Redding calls “Analytic
Neo-Hegelianism” (2011). Bran-
dom himself presents some as-
pects of his philosophical contri-
butions in terms of an approxi-
mation to Hegel. In fact, quo-
ting Richard Rorty, Brandom says
that his work, as well as Mc-
Dowell’s, helps to push analy-
tic philosophy from its Kantian
phase into its unavoidable Hege-
lian phase (BRANDOM, 2011).
From a historical point of view,
such a move is quite interesting
if we consider that a major part
of contemporary philosophy rai-
sed upon the explicit and deli-
berate rejection of Hegel’s philo-
sophy and his epigones. Almost
every aspect of the philosophy of
the second half of 19th century
and beginning of 20th was direc-
tly or indirectly influenced by the
refusal of Absolute Idealism and
its consequences not only for logic
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and natural sciences, but also for
history, sociology and culture. Yet,
despite the specific importance of
that revival of philosophers from
the past, what is particularly no-
teworthy is the progressive ack-
nowledgement of the procedure
of rational reconstruction as a va-
lid, justified and profitable way of
doing philosophy even inside the
analytic tradition.
Following Beaney’s definition,
“A rational reconstruction of a
(purported) body of knowledge
or conceptual scheme or set of
events is a redescription and reor-
ganization of that body or scheme
or set that exhibits the logical
(or rational) relations between
its elements” (BEANEY, 2013, p.
253).1 In modern philosophy, its
roots can be broadly found in
Neo-Kantianism and in logicism,
which is itself another interesting
sign of proximity between the two
philosophical trends in the 19th
century. On the one hand, the
distinction between quid juris and
quid facti is crucial to Kant and
his followers. Such a differenti-
ation was reworked and presen-
ted under various other terms,
like Lotze’s distinction between
genesis (Genese) and validity (Gel-
tung), or Windelband’s distincti-
ons between the genetic and the
critical method or the differenti-
ation between discovery and jus-
tification. All of them are con-
ditions of possibility of a “redes-
cription” or “reorganization” of a
given body or set of claims aiming
to make explicit its sometimes-
hidden internal logic. On the
other hand, the logicist project,
which assumes the idea that one
set of elements can be reconcei-
ved in terms of another (numbers
in terms of extensions of concepts,
for example) is also a type of ratio-
nal reconstruction2; Carnap’s Auf-
bau is another. Frege himself is
absolutely committed to the prin-
ciple, exposed in the Grundlagen,
that “There must be a sharp sepa-
ration of the psychological from
the logical, the subjective from the
objective” (FREGE, 1997, p. 90).
However, because rational re-
construction is a philosophical
procedure that focuses on the in-
dependence and precedence of
the logical validity and structure
over the psychological dimension
of a set of claims, it is totally justi-
fied when it comes to taking such
a set or body of claims, like the
set of claims of a third person
or even a philosopher from the
past. In fact, once again, even
1The general reconstruction presented in the next paragraphs are drawn from BEANEY, 2013.
2 Like Beaney points out, despite Frege uses the term “reduction”, it is a sort of rational reconstruction (2013,
p. 235).
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inside the analytic tradition, we
have examples of such exercises in
Russell’s book on Leibniz (A Cri-
tical Exposition of the Philosophy
of Leibniz, 2005) and Dummett’s
work on Frege (Frege: Philosophy
of Language, 1973), not to mention
Strawson’s on Kant. In Russell’s
own words, in the scope of ratio-
nal reconstruction
We may even learn, by ob-
serving the contradictions
and inconsistencies from
which no system hitherto
propounded is free, what
are the fundamental ob-
jections to the type in
question, and how these
objections are to be avoi-
ded. But in such inqui-
ries the philosopher is no
longer explained psycho-
logically: he is examined
as the advocate of what he
holds to be a body of phi-
losophic truth. By what
process of development
he came to this opinion,
though in itself an impor-
tant and interesting ques-
tion, is logically irrelevant
to the inquiry how far
the opinion itself is cor-
rect; and among his opi-
nions, when these have
been ascertained, it be-
comes desirable to prune
away such as seem incon-
sistent with his main doc-
trines, before those doctri-
nes themselves are subjec-
ted to a critical scrutiny.
(RUSSELL, 2005, xx)
We arrive here at a very inte-
resting metaphilosophical point.
In reconstructing an author’s
thought, we are not simply ex-
tracting ideas from the text but
doing at least two creative proces-
ses. Firstly, when we talk about
“reconstruction” we should re-
ally mean it. The interpreter-
reconstructor is not only unders-
tanding theses or ideas from a
previously given set of claims,
but is actively suggesting a dif-
ferent composition or structure
for that set of claims that could
be, eventually, for the sake of an
argument, for instance, even bet-
ter than the original made by the
author himself. Of course, such
meaning of reconstruction pre-
supposes the possibility of deta-
chment of the rationale from the
original form and frame. But such
presupposition is the very basis
of rational reconstruction and is
usually not so hard to defend; suf-
fice it to say that the same pre-
supposition is being held when it
comes to the translation of a sta-
tement or argument to a symbolic
language.
The second and, for my purpo-
ses here, the most important crea-
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tive aspect of rational reconstruc-
tion is the procedure of ascrip-
tion. In a rational reconstruction,
the interpreter is not being me-
rely prompted by a given work
(cf. BEANEY, 2013, p. 253), but is
actively ascribing inferential pro-
positions to an author. And here
we are at the very tensional point
regarding an approach that wants
to be both historically informed
and coherent and philosophically
relevant. Like Beaney says, “a ra-
tional reconstruction is better the
more it is historically informed,
and vice versa; so that ideal work
in history of philosophy combines
both.” (BEANEY, 1996, p. 3)3.
Of course, that is a regula-
tive ideal which presents many
obstacles and can be reached
only to varying degrees. We can
have a glimpse of such difficul-
ties in Daniel Garber’s example
of reading Descartes’ Meditations
(2005). Everybody knows that
its metaphysics is supposed to be
the ground of a broader project
for Descartes’ system of sciences.
Thus, it should be read together
with his other works having in
mind his analogy of a tree and its
branches. But, like Garber says,
why stop here? To fully unders-
tand his project, it is important to
know that it was designed against
the Aristotelian model taught at
La Flèche, which takes us to other
proponents of similar candida-
tes – like Gassendi and Galileo,
as well as to Aristotle himself in
order to understand and evalu-
ate how Descartes’ thoughts are
good against their self-imposed
aim. But, once again, why stop
here? Garber reminds us that Des-
cartes project was also designed
against the whole social, theolo-
gical and university system ba-
sed on authority and it is really
helpful to know its elements and
structures. Well, why, then, stop
here? It would be really useful
to know about the Church de-
pendence on some views based
on an Aristotelian metaphysics.
Garber’s example can be puzz-
ling because it is very justifiable
and, actually, it is justified for me,
even though, as Garber says, “I
can see certain readers becoming
more and more impatient: where
is the philosophical interest in all
of this?” (GARBER, 2005, p. 138)
I certainly don’t intend to pre-
sent any final solution to such a
problem. However, I do think
that Brandom’s approach to his-
3Thus, I can see no reason for identifying Rational Reconstruction and Appropriationism as Mercer (2019, p.
30) does. Of course, a deeper engagement with her thesis would demand another paper, but I think it is a defen-
sible position to say that GTRC principle can include what (logically) follows from a statement; in other words, to
understand what a philosopher is saying can include its inferential consistence, even though such inferences were
not fully explicit.
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tory of philosophy can be seen as a
good tool to deal with it. To some
extent, it is what Brandom does
when he turns to Kant, Frege, Hei-
degger and, mainly, Hegel. But
more than that, Brandom’s way
of dealing with philosophers from
the past is also a device to expand
our understanding of them.
2 - History of Philosophy De
Dicto and De Re
In order to fully understand Bran-
dom´s approach, we need to ex-
plore a bit of its background
which is rooted on a concept of ra-
tionality which, at the same time,
provides the foundations for his
inferentialism. In the Introduc-
tion of TMD, Brandom presents
five models of rationality (logical,
instrumental, translational, infe-
rential, and historical). The dis-
tinctive mark of the first two is
that they see rationality “as being
a matter of the structure of re-
asoning rather than its content”
(TMD, 4). Instead, the last th-
ree understand being rational as
a matter of what makes a proposi-
tion interpretable or playing a role
in a material inference. For Bran-
dom´s purpose -and mine- the in-
ferential model not only explains
how reason works but provides a
tool to evaluate philosophical po-
sitions and commitments.
It is important to see that it is
not necessary that one commits
himself to Brandom´s inferentia-
lism from cover to cover. Consi-
dered in itself, inferentialism is
a view about what language is
and how it works, i. e. through
the process of making inferences
rather than representations (as a
representationalist would argue).
However, it is fundamental to see
the importance of making mate-
rial inferences and what it means
concerning philosophical commit-
ments. For the inferential model,
“to be rational is to be a producer
and consumer of reasons: things
that can play the role of both pre-
mises and conclusions of inferen-
ces. So long as one can assert and
infer, one is rational” (TMD, 6). It
means that to be rational means
to be able to articulate conceptual
contents in material, rather than
logical, inferences like “If A is at
the right of B, B is at the left of
A”4.
If we accept such a core infe-
rentialist view, we can unders-
tand how Brandom develops such
a view as a device for rational in-
terpretation. If rationality is inhe-
rently inferential, conceptual in-
4As Brandom says, the inferential incorporates the logical and the interpretational models, since logic does not
define what rationality is, but makes it possible for us to express our commitments and its structure.
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terpretation can be seen not only
as a matter of making more or less
explicit what is hidden somehow
in a concept or a set of concepts,
judgements and arguments, but
also as a matter of drawing infe-
rences from them. In Brandom’s
words, conceptual interpretation
under an inferential role is “the
ability to distinguish what follows
from a claim, and what would be
evidence for or against it, what
one would be committing oneself
to by asserting it, and what could
entitle one to such a commitment”
(TMD, 95).
Brandom presents, then, both
in Making it Explicit and in Ta-
les of the Mighty Dead, two major
ways of doing that, namely, what
he calls de dicto and de re inferen-
tial interpretations. The distinc-
tion traces back to Quine (1956)
and his account on propositional
attitudes which is, to some extent,
what we are dealing with. Under
such inferentialist point of view,
conceptual or textual interpreta-
tion is to be seen as ascription of
propositional attitudes, roughly
understood as an attitude some-
one has towards a proposition5.
Its structure can be also roughly
understood like
S believes (hopes/thinks) that
Q Ps
Exs.:
(a) Gabriel believes that Mario
considers Brentano a great
philosopher.
(b) Gabriel thinks that Ernesto
agrees with Mario about the
content of the former exam-
ple.
Where the main parts are verbs
like believe, hopes, thinks and what
literature usually calls the “that
clause,” followed by a proposi-
tion.
In order to interpret conceptual
content and ascriptions in this
way, Brandom reminds us that we
must always appeal to a context,
“for the inferential significance of
a claim –what follows from it– de-
pends on what other claims one
can treat as auxiliary hypotheses
in extracting those consequences”
(TMD, 95). When it comes spe-
cifically to such ascriptions rela-
ted to making conceptual and in-
ferential interpretations of philo-
sophical texts, which is the goal
of Brandom’s book, one of the
main sources for such a set of
auxiliary or collateral hypotheses
is provided by other claims that
the author who is being analyzed
acknowledges as expressing his
5See Quine, 1956 and Russell, 2010. Russell does not like using the term “attitude” (p. 60) because it points to
a psychological trace, but the expression “propositional attitude” has been used notwithstanding it.
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thoughts or, simply, as true. Such
claims can be extracted from his
other writings, historical contexts,
letters, disputes, etc., as long as
the (interpreter knows that the)
author acknowledges them as sta-
ting his own claims. Hence, in
such a way, the textual interpre-
tation of ascription is a sort of pa-
raphrase (see TMD, 96) that ta-
kes its premises from the author’s
acknowledged or acknowledgea-
ble universe of claims. When it
follows such a way, we have what
Brandom calls a de dicto specifi-
cation of content or commitment.
Thus,
De dicto =df an inferential con-
ceptual interpretation or specifi-
cation of a claim through appe-
aling only to collateral premises
or auxiliary hypotheses that are
co-acknowledged with that claim
(TMD, 97).
In other words, de dicto ascrip-
tions want to determine “what
the author would in fact have
said in response to various questi-
ons of clarification and extension”
(TMD, 99). The context is sup-
plied by the author himself, either
directly (in the text itself or not)
or indirectly (via historical con-
text, connections etc.). For ins-
tance, if “S believes that the sum of
the internal angles of every trian-
gle equals 180o”, we can infer that
“S co-acknowledge6 that the sum of
the internal angles of every triangle
equals two right angles”.
For Brandom, de dicto interpre-
tation is a very important and de-
manding mode of doing intellec-
tual history (see TMD, 99). In or-
der to do so, one has to have a
mastery over what a philosopher
wrote, said, and read, as well as
what he, to some extent, lived.
However, the process of making
clearer and more explicit what a
philosophical text says, bringing
to the surface its hidden assump-
tions or pretexts, reveals only one
philosophical dimension of it. By
interpreting a text we want to un-
derstand
(. . . ) what speakers
think they are committing
themselves to by what
they say, what they in
some sense intend to be
committing themselves
to, what they would take
to be consequences of the
claims they made. But be-
sides the question of what
one takes to follow from a
claim one has made, there
is the issue of what really
follows from it. (TMD,
100).
6(TMD, 97).
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Thus, beyond the process of ma-
king explicit some claims th-
rough paraphrase, substitutions
and conceptual interpretations,
Brandom points out to a diffe-
rent perspective or inferential ap-
proach whose goal is, now, ma-
king explicit what inferentially re-
ally follows from a claim. Such
emphasis in the “really follows”
clause is very important here for
what it means in interpretational
terms. It means, above all, that
inferences derived under such
perspective are independent of
the author’s acknowledgement or,
in other words, it derives actual
commitments independently of
what the author actually ackno-
wledges. For instance, if one be-
lieves that the content of this bot-
tle is water, and that water quen-
ches thirst, one is committed to
the fact that H2O quenches thirst
whether one realizes or not the
chemical formula of water. That
is what Brandom calls de re infe-
rence. But in order to make such
kind of inferences, the interpre-
ter also needs an auxiliary set of
claims. However, in de re ascripti-
ons, such a set does not come from
what the analyzed author would
“co-acknowledge” as his own set,
but comes from what the interpre-
ter takes as being true. Getting
back to the former example:
(P1) S believes that the sum of
the internal angles of every trian-
gle equals 180o.
(P2 De Dicto) S believes that the
sum of the internal angles of every
triangle equals two right angles.
(P3) S is committed to the truth
of Euclid´s proposition I. 32.(De
Re).
Hence, De re =df an inferen-
tial conceptual ascription of what
really follows from the premi-
ses, even against a different back-
ground or starting from a dif-
ferent set of auxiliary hypothe-
ses that is now supplied by what
the interpreter, rather than the
author, holds to be true. Thus, “in
de re readings, by drawing conclu-
sions from the text in the context,
the interpreter is actively media-
ting between two sets of commit-
ments. Text-and-context on the
one hand, and interpreter on the
other, both have their distinctive
7Brandom points to D. Lewis as a precursor of such way of thinking: “This sort of stripping down and building
back – a process whose moto is “reculer pour mieux sauter” – is a form of understanding. When I was a graduate
student, my teacher, David Lewis advocated a picture of philosophy like this. The way to understand some region
of philosophical terrain is for each investigator to state a set of principles as clearly as she could, and then rigo-
rously to determine what follows from them, what they rule out, and how one might argue for or against them. The
more disparate the starting points, the better sense the crisscrossing derivational paths from them would give us
of the topography of the landscape they were embedded in. What is recommended is hermeneutic triangulation:
achieving a kind of understanding of or grip on an object (a conceptually articulated content) by having many
inferential and constructional routes to and through it. The more paths one knows through the wood, the better
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roles” (TMD, 109).7 Therefore, as
Brandom sums it up in Making it
explicit,
The ascriber of a doxas-
tic commitment has got
two different perspecti-
ves available from which
to draw those auxiliary
hypotheses in specifying
the content of the commit-
ment being ascribed: that
of the one to whom it is as-
cribed and that of the one
ascribing it. Where the
specification of the con-
tent depends only on au-
xiliary premises that, ac-
cording to the ascriber,
the target of the ascription
acknowledges being com-
mitted to, it is put in de
dicto position, within the
’that’ clause. Where the
specification of the con-
tent depends on auxiliary
premises that the ascriber
endorses, but the target
of the ascription may not,
it is put in de re position.
(MIE, 506. Cf. 507)
It is noteworthy that Brandom ad-
vocates the importance and legi-
timacy of De Re inferences as an
approach to the history of phi-
losophy. Besides the usual De
Dicto perspective, we should ack-
nowledge the worth of De Re his-
toriography since it aims at the
same kind of universe of infe-
rences or ascriptions, namely, the
author’s commitments. The only
difference is upon where the set
of auxiliary claims comes from8.
In the end, such type of histori-
ography is precisely what Bran-
dom did in part two of TMD with
Leibniz, Hegel, Frege, Heidegger,
and Sellars, through the four fol-
lowing steps (see TMD, 112-114):
1. Selecting the texts;
2. Further selection (aiming cen-
tral claims which will be used)
and supplementation;
3. Deriving (from multipremise
inferences) claims;
4. Assessing the adequacy of
such inferred claims.
Well, that is what I am going to
do, as a little exercise, with a cou-
ple excerpts by Kierkegaard in the
next section.
one knows one´s way around in it” (TMD, 114-115).
8“As was indicated by the discussion of de re readings, there is no reason why the target claims need be restricted
to de dicto characterizations of what appears in the text” (TMD, 112).
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4 - Kierkegaard De Dicto and De
Re
For better or for worse, the phi-
losophical network of Kierkega-
ard’s relations sometimes seems
to be completely done9. Whether
it be the range of philosophical
topics or his relations to the phi-
losophical context of 19th and 20th
century, the interpretative litera-
ture seems to have little space for
improvements. However, a cou-
ple of works have pushed those
boundaries in recent years, brin-
ging to the surface hidden the-
mes or connections, like Kierke-
gaard’s reception of and depen-
dence on Trendelenburg’s logische
Frage when it comes to his cri-
ticism on Hegel’s logic, for ins-
tance10. Among the unexplored
topics, Kierkegaard’s ontology is
one of the most interesting. If it is
true, on the one hand, that Kier-
kegaard’s existential turn became
commonplace in the literature, on
the other hand, its metaphysical
roots and unfoldings are still an
almost untouched topic. Just to
shed some light on what I am tal-
king about, consider that one of
Kierkegaard’s philosophical wor-
ries is, in a nutshell, in his claim
that
(. . . ) speculative thought
repeatedly wants to ar-
rive at actuality and gi-
ves assurances that what
is thought is the actual,
that thinking is not only
able to think but also to
provide actuality, which
is just the opposite; and at
the same time what it me-
ans to exist is more and
more forgotten. (CUP1,
319 / SKS 7, 291)
And yet when we read through
most of his interpreters, we find
that they focus exclusively on the
ethical or religious effects of his
quest for the meaning of existence
and rarely say a word about the
metaphysical ground. Moreover,
such a perspective also plays a
dominant role when it comes to
evaluating his thematic relations
to later philosophy. However, if
we agree with Brandom and with
the reasons I presented above on
the legitimacy of a De Re histori-
ographic/philosophic approach, I
think we can push the boundaries
a lit bit through Kierkegaard’s de
9I am fully aware of the bundle of aspects and problems one can face when ignoring Kierkegaard’s use of
pseudonyms and ascribe views and statements to Kierkegaard himself. However, what is at stake here are the
philosophical inferences one can derive from his work and, rather than verify if such and such theses belong to his
personal set of beliefs.
10See FERREIRA, 2013; 2015; 2017. For excellent examples of such “pushing the boundaries” on other topics,
see WEBB, 2017, and THONHAUSER, 2016.
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re interpretation. In order to illus-
trate, allow me to carry out a short
experiment along these lines.
One of the central problems in
ontology can be stated like this:
we surely know that there are dif-
ferent kinds of existing things, na-
mely, humans, tables, properties,
geometrical relations, numbers,
fictional characters, and maybe
even God. But does it mean that
there are different ways of existing
or being? If it does, are all of such
ways of being on the same level
or are there degrees of being? Is
any of them primitive and, others,
derived? On the other hand, if dif-
ferent kinds of existing things do
not mean different ways of being,
how can we understand such a
difference in a unified (or univo-
cal?) way?
In contemporary analytic philo-
sophy, partially inspired by Frege
and Russell, and fully by Quine,
the dominant view is that there
are not different ways of being,
which means that whatever being
means, it has the same meaning
for all entities about which we
could they are. Nevertheless, his-
tory has plenty of examples of
philosophers who endorse the op-
posite position. We could men-
tion Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas,
Meinong, Lotze, Husserl, Moore,
Heidegger, but also young Bren-
tano, young Russell and, argua-
bly, Frege.11 Nowadays, we are ha-
ving a revival of this dispute, with
some new contenders on the side
of what has been called Ontologi-
cal Pluralism (OP) (see MILLER,
2002; TURNER, 2010; CAPLAN,
2011; BERTO, 2013; GABRIEL,
2015; MCDANIEL, 2009, 2017).12
One of the strategies of Ontolo-
gical Pluralists has been, besides
the straightforward argumenta-
tion, revisiting old philosophers
looking for their arguments for
OP, as well as their reasons for
holding such a position. In this
sense, it is noteworthy that some
of them call themselves as “Neo-
Meinongnians”. If “existence” is
the central theme of Kierkegaard’s
thought, does he have any side in
such a dispute? Let’s briefly con-
sider some propositions from Ki-
erkegaard’s work:
(P1) God does not exist (existe-
rer ikke), he is eternal (CUP1, p.
332 / SKS 7, 303);
(P2) A human being exists (exis-
terer) (CUP1, p. 332 / SKS 7, 303);
(P3) Ideas have a thought-
existence (Tanke realitet) which is
neither human’s existence (CUP1,
p. 329 / SKS 7, 301);
(P4) nor a physical object’s way
11See Turner (2010) and McDaniel (2017).
12McDaniel (2017) just won the American Philosophical Association’s 2018 Sanders Book Prize.
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of being (CUP1, p. 330-331 / SKS
7, 301);
(P5 De dicto paraphrase) There
are irreducible different modes of
being;
(P6 – Interpreter´s claim) A
philosopher who assumes there
are irreducible different modes
of being believes that ontological
pluralism is true;
(P7 De Re) Kierkegaard belie-
ves that ontological pluralism is
true13.
Concerning the propositions
above, some things are no-
teworthy. As indicated by the re-
ferences, P1 to P4 are extracted
directly from quotations by Kier-
kegaard and have their truth va-
lue drawn from the philosopher´s
own statements. P5, on the other
hand, is never asserted like that
by Kierkegaard, but follows direc-
tly from the claims above with no
need of any other premise. When
it comes to P7, our De Re con-
clusion, things are slightly diffe-
rent. The interpreter, in this case,
is deeply interested in ontologi-
cal questions and provides an au-
xiliary claim (P6) which comes
from a different context. Howe-
ver, Kierkegaard´s claims (P1 to
P4) and what de dicto follows from
them (P5), can now be put against
(P6) in order to see what follows.
When it comes to (P6), it is worth
noticing that there is a twofold
way; on the one hand, we could
proceed to examine if the author,
Kierkegaard in this case, provides
any arguments supporting it and,
on the other hand, we could as-
sume (P6) as true on the interpre-
ter’s basis. Therefore, in assuming
the second way, namely, that (P6)
is true –and that is the interpre-
ter´s responsibility, as Brandom
says–, it is also true that (P7), even
though the author of (P1) to (P4)
never heard about (P6)14.
If we turn back to Kierkegaard’s
main concern – in order to verify
the adequacy of our conclusion
– namely, “what does it mean to
exist?”, one can see that ontolo-
gical pluralism is absolutely cen-
tral to his philosophical endea-
vor. Reversely, understanding Ki-
erkegaard’s ontological commit-
ments in terms of ontological plu-
ralism helps us to understand his
own objectives in a better and
clearer fashion. The main pro-
blem for which ontological plu-
13As McDaniel defines, “So I offer up the following more general sufficient condition: one believes in ways of
being if one believes that there is more than one relatively fundamental meaning for an existential quantifier.”
(2017, 37).
14It is important to have in mind that the burden of proof regarding the truth-value of auxiliary claims must not
necessarily be on the author, since it can be the case he never explicitly formulated it. The point is that, since such
auxiliary claim is provided, such and such consequences follow from it.
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ralism is an answer can be stated
as: “Do some objects enjoy more
being or existence than other ob-
jects?” (see MCDANIEL, 2017, 1).
The way Kierkegaard understands
the mode of existence of human
beings cannot be fully grasped
unless we recognize two ontolo-
gical features of reality. Thus, on
one hand, it is true that some en-
tities can be said to be univocally
actual, like God, human beings,
and a fly, since actuality is not
subject to degrees (see PF, 41- 42 /
SKS 4, 246). But on the other hand
Kierkegaard is ontologically com-
mitted to degrees of being that are
irreducible to any other, namely,
the eternal uncreated being (of
God), the infinite created being
or subsistence (or what he calls
“ideas”—i.e., logical and mathe-
matical relations and properties),
the intermediate existential being
(of human beings) and finite being
(of physical objects).
Now, we have some very in-
teresting roads before us. One
possible next step of our de re
inferential exercise would be to
keep on this track and try to find
out whether Kierkegaard has any
hints on the primitiveness of a
restricted existential quantifier
(over an unrestricted existential
quantifier), since contemporary
defenders of Ontological Plura-
lism argue that the Quinean un-
restricted existential quantifier is
not enough to deal with different
modes of being because, using
David Lewis-Plato’s terminology,
they do not “carve nature at the
joints.” But another interesting
path would be to evaluate how
Kierkegaard’s ontological com-
mitments are close to or distant
from, for instance, Meinong’s. Is
there for Kierkegaard any space
and arguments for Außerseiend
or is he another victim of “the
prejudice in favor of the actual”
(MEINONG, 1999, §§2, 11)? Yet
another road would lead us to de
re infer Kierkegaard’s positions on
central quarrels of 19th century
philosophy that are, despite the
chronology, inside his scope, like
Materialismusstreit and Psicologis-
musstreit, for instance. The Da-
nish philosopher, we know, was
a fierce critic of what we would
call “reductionism” or “elimina-
tivism” concerning consciousness
today, but he also dealt with the
question of how an actual existent
relates to ideal entities, for ins-
tance. It seems to me that we have
promising roads to tread.
4 - Conclusion
Therefore, as far as I can see, Bran-
dom’s approach is interesting in
three ways:
1. By getting back to philo-
sophers from the past in order
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to infer De Re commitments,
Brandom does, at the same
time, (a) a rational recons-
truction exposing how Kant,
Hegel, Frege, and Heidegger
foresaw some aspects of his
pragmatic semantics and infe-
rentialism, but also, how such
positions help us to unders-
tand theirs. Thus, by connec-
ting a contemporary view to
dead philosophers’ positions
via inferential commitments,
we can leave aside Rorty’s and
Beaney’s worries about ana-
chronism; it is not a mat-
ter of suspiciously and doubt-
fully ascribing contemporary
views to a philosopher from
the past, but, rather, making
explicit what is, so to speak,
already there. As Brandom re-
minds us, de dicto and de re
ascriptions are not two diffe-
rent realms of truths or com-
mitments, but “specify the
single conceptual content of
a single belief in two diffe-
rent ways, from two different
perspectives, in two different
contexts of auxiliary commit-
ments” (TMD, 102)15;
2. Therefore, de re textual in-
terpretations of philosophers
from the past are as legiti-
mate as de dicto ones. In
other words, specifying de
re inferences should be seen
as a logically justified source
for doing history of philo-
sophy and, conversely, helps
us to deal with Garber’s-style-
problems. If, like Beaney re-
minds us, a rational recons-
truction is better the more
it is historically informed, in
the case of de re inferences it
is evident that putting such
inferences against a histori-
cal background is essential, at
least to evaluate if, on the
one hand, a logically justi-
fied position is not, on the
other hand, contextually con-
tradictory. However, since in
this inferential game we are
not trying to exclusively un-
derstand a philosopher’s the-
sis, but rather, to expose what
follows (logically) from his
15The controversy about anachronism is long and it would demand another paper. However, there are good
works reassessing and even defending its importance for doing history of philosophy. See LÆRKE; SMITH; SCH-
LIESSER (2013) and LENZ (. . . ), who makes a very interesting point: “Of course, Descartes did not read Wittgens-
tein. But does that also mean that reading Wittgenstein can tell us nothing about Descartes? Let me consider two
objections to the historian’s answer. Firstly, this answer ignores the fact that philosophers and other authors often
write for future generations. Descartes, Spinoza, but also Kant, Nietzsche and others were clearly writing decidedly
for future audiences. To explain their texts only by reference to their time impoverishes the philosophical potential.
In fact, this point generalizes: any research project is future directed. We would not begin to do research, had we
not the hope that it might lead to more knowledge in the future. If we study the development of ideas, it’s crucial
to look at their potential futures, and this could very well involve Wittgenstein’s reaction to the Cartesian concept
of mind.” (p. 4)
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positions, it seems, at least,
easier to have a clue about
how to answer Garber’s “in-
convenient” “why stop here”
question, namely, because the
contextual-fact x cannot be de
re connected to the ascription
A16.
3. TMD connects a “motley
group” of philosophers (Spi-
noza, Leibniz, Hegel, Frege,
Heidegger, and Sellars) (TMD,
16). However, one of the
explicit goals of the book is
to make such a connection
“seem less so after we work
through this material than
they would before” (TMD,
16). Hence, more specifically
about Kierkegaard and the
broader scenario of 19th/20th
century philosophy, such a
way can also make an ap-
proximation of Kierkega-
ard, Lotze, and Meinong less
weird, as well as, for ins-
tance, Kierkegaard and Hei-
degger –through the ontolo-
gical commitment to ways of
being– less obvious and less
cliché. As one can see, a desi-
rable outcome, such reassess-
ments provide us tools and ar-
guments for rethink the very
philosophical canon.
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